From a review of a talk by Daniel Garber, (Chair of Princeton’s Philosophy Department):
http://mu-warrior.blogspot.com/2009/...s-lecture.html
Explaining more fully his decision to not give in to theistic temptations, Garber seems to indicate that (unlike many arrogant believers and nonbelievers) his choice was not made to exhibit his rational intellectual superiority over his opposites. He explains that he chooses not to take Pascal up on his wager because by so doing, he is certain he would become a believer. But his belief would be founded upon self-deceit: he would be willingly subjecting his rationality to an entity he knows cannot be rationally proved to even exist. This last step he is unwilling to take. But in reducing the arguments of both theism and atheism to the great struggle of comprehending the interrelationship of reason and faith and truth, Garber certainly emphasizes the relevance of Aquinas and provides an excellent example of how atheists and theists should carry on their endless debate.
If we agree that either a good God exists and we’ll all (eventually) be okay in the afterlife, or we’re all basically screwed if an evil God exists, or it won’t matter if no God exists, then the issue becomes what’s best for us in this life.
So, in the framework of the theist/atheist debate, what Garber seems to be suggesting is that the issue isn’t so much about whether or not God exists, but instead that there are essentially two positions as to what leads to a happier, more fulfilling and more meaningful present life:
a) athiest – happier and more fulfilled living his life knowing he does not believe in something that cannot rationally (or empirically) be proved to exist.
b) theist – happier and more fulfilled living her life believing a good God exists.
(I do object to the manner in which the author, or Garber, conflates ‘not rationally provable’ with ‘self-deceit’. Clearly I know things, like subjective states, that are simply self-evident and not really provable in a rational, objective or empirical sense, so I don’t consider myself suffering self-deception just because subjective knowledge is not provable.)